[v1.x] fix: prevent command injection in example URL opening#2085
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[v1.x] fix: prevent command injection in example URL opening#2085
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Backport of #2082 to v1.x. Replace platform-specific subprocess calls with webbrowser.open() and add URL scheme validation (http/https allowlist) to block dangerous protocol handlers in the URL elicitation example client.
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| print(f"Failed to open browser: {e}") | ||
| print(f"Please manually open: {url}") |
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logger.exception I think while we're here
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Backport of #2082 to v1.x.
Motivation and Context
The
open_browser()function in the URL elicitation example client usedsubprocess.run(["start", url], shell=True)on Windows, which allows shell metacharacter injection via crafted URLs. A malicious MCP server could send a URL likehttps://example.com/?state=abc&calcduring URL elicitation, andcmd.exewould interpret&as a command separator, executing arbitrary commands.How Has This Been Tested?
Code review — this is an example file, not library code. The changes are identical to the merged #2082.
Breaking Changes
None.
Types of changes
Checklist
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